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LEGAL FEELING: THE PLACE OF INTIMACY IN
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE LAW
NANCY BENTLEY*
Does law properly control sexual and family intimacy? Debates
about this question have tended to turn not on whether it is proper,
but rather when it is proper, and a shared assumption about the need
to regulate intimacy has a visible function in legal history. Midway
through their reasoning in support of segregation law, for instance,
the justices in Plessy v. Ferguson paused to remind the public of the
self-evident fact that the law prohibits-must and should prohibit-
black-white intermarriage.1 Requiring no elaboration, the terse
paragraph locates a baseline legitimacy for segregation that is con-
firmed through a shared understanding-surely this much we all
know. In the legal history following Plessy, of course, this knowledge
would eventually fall away. But while a ban on interracial marriage is
now seen as plainly unjust, where it was once held self-evident, the
felt need to have laws govern the bounds of intimacy remains a
touchstone in legal debates.2 That the assumption endures while its
content changes is instructive. It suggests that to ask whether law
should control intimacy may be to get things backwards; in important
respects, intimacy can be said to direct or control law.
The history of anti-miscegenation laws in the nineteenth-century
United States is part of a broader cultural history that reverses our
usual way of speaking about law as governing the limits of intimacy.
What cultural historians have called the "power of sentiment" proved
* Nancy Bentley, Associate Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, is the
author of The Ethnography of Manners, a study of the historical links between realist fiction and
ethnography. She is currently writing a book about the way forms of affect shaped law and
literary culture in nineteenth-century America.
1. 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896).
2. Vehemently rejecting a petition to recognize the marriage of a black-white couple, one
Tennessee judge observed that toleration of their marriage would surely lead to accepting
father-daughter marriage, the Turk "establish[ing] his harem at the doors of the capitol," or
"revolting" specters of incest and polygamy, State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 10-11 (1872). These
arguments have continued to be invoked in debates about marriage law long after the U.S.
Supreme Court found anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional.
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capable in the nineteenth century of directing or reforming legal
regimes in momentous ways, from the abolition of slavery to the
liberalization of divorce.3 These forms of sentiment have continued
through the twentieth century and into our own time in uneven ways.
But to the extent that we still live in a society governed by norms of
proper feeling (and some observers see these social powers of feeling
as vast and only increasing in strength and scope), the power of
sentiment remains a potential force. 4 The cultural force of intimacy, I
shall argue, lies in the shared sense that it originates somewhere
outside either culture or law, in the immediacy of individual feeling.
This conviction is questionable at best; feelings cannot transcend
history any more than can the individuals who experience them. Yet
the belief that feeling is ahistorical has allowed forms of intimate
feeling to make history.
In the United States, interracial intimacy bespeaks a national his-
tory. After much intellectual effort to define what is distinctively
American about American culture, scholars in American Studies
have turned away from an "exceptionalist" framework that presumed
a national distinctiveness in advance.' But recently one scholar,
speaking seriously and waggishly in equal measure, has stepped forth
to suggest that the question of what distinguishes American culture
may be answerable after all: American-ness is the "prohibiting [of]
black-white heterosexual couples from forming families and
withholding legitimacy from their descendants. '6 Werner Sollors
demonstrates that the protracted ban on black-white unions may well
be America's most distinctive cultural difference from other Western
societies.7 Like a negative photographic exposure, a will to prohibit
black-white marriage defines the outlines of a national culture.
3. See generally THE CULTURE OF SENTIMENT: RACE, GENDER, AND SENTIMENTALITY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Shirley Samuels ed., 1992), for representative essays in
this vein of cultural history.
4. See, e.g., LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY:
ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 5 (Michble Aina Barele et al. eds., 1997) (arguing that
contemporary U.S. culture increasingly "renders citizenship as a condition of social membership
produced by personal acts and values, especially acts originating in or directed toward the
family sphere," a trend that gives greater political valence to a sphere of intimacy and private
feeling while simultaneously devaluing the public sphere of politics as such).
5. See generally George M. Fredrickson, From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent
Developments in Cross-National Comparative History, 82 J. OF AM. HIST. 587 (1995); Michael
Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 1 (1993).
6. Werner Sollors, Introduction to INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND LAW 3, 5 (Werner Sollors ed., 2000) [hereinafter
INTERRACIALISM].
7. Id. at 4-5.
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This Article examines two cultural forces that operate in this le-
gal history: the surprising claims that intimacy can make on legiti-
macy, and the opposing force of legal stigma that that intimacy may
provoke. In an attempt to pinpoint these forces, I begin with an
instructive moment in what we could call the public history of inti-
macy. At the height of the slavery crisis, Lincoln, in his speeches,
would ridicule Democrats' charge that critics of slavery were really
proponents of miscegenation. "I protest [the idea]," Lincoln would
announce, "that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave, I
do necessarily want her for a wife."'8 Taking their cue, audiences
would break into laughter. But upon what exactly did this joke turn?
By laughing, Lincoln's white audiences joined him in a rather com-
plex public ritual. The predicted laughter depended on a shared
understanding that while a black woman might well be desirable as a
slave, she could never be desirable as a wife. Lincoln's line was
tactically brilliant, as artful as it was compressed. Because the rheto-
ric of abolitionists had long made wanting a Negro woman for a slave
a code for sexual possession the joke allowed Lincoln to subtly
redirect the miscegenation charge back at his pro-slavery critics. At
the same time, the line allowed him to substitute for sex the very
different issue of marriage, when marrying a Negro was more easily
held up as a laughing matter-or at least as a matter of easier laugh-
ter-than that of sex. With this deft maneuver, Lincoln gave the slip
to the miscegenation trap.
But, though preeminently tactical, Lincoln's laugh line also an-
ticipated a cultural operation of racial stigmatizing that would be-
come a central feature of Jim Crow society. Lincoln's joke was
compulsive, an artifact of speech enacting an anxiety that was both
expressed and contained through repetition. For, if Lincoln's joke
treated marriage to a black woman as self-evidently absurd, it was a
self-evidence that required the ritual-reinforcement of regular public
affirmation. As historian Martha Hodes has shown, in antebellum
America black-white marriages were far from unknown despite
widespread anti-miscegenation laws that punished these "shameful
8. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 397-98, 454-55,636 (Don
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989); see also SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR,
SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 184 (1997) (linking this
oft-repeated line in Lincoln's campaign speeches to broader postemancipation efforts to finesse
a "divided commitment to equality and inferiority" in federal law).
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matches."9 Communities, North and South, knew of and in degrees
tolerated the desire of some Americans to marry across the color
line.1° Though distasteful, then, such marriages in that period were
not unthinkable; that they were not unthinkable could be said to have
prompted a white public to insist they were laughable, and to prove it
by perpetually laughing. The response was expressive of a will to
stigmatize; Lincoln's laugh line defended black liberation by publicly
marking the abjection of the black woman and directing ridicule at
any white man who consented to marry her. And it is no coincidence
that Lincoln expressed that will to stigmatize precisely in the moment
he advocated the liberation of black men and women from slaves into
legal subjects. The fullest expression of the will to stigmatize took the
form of law through the Jim Crow legislation that, like the Plessy
decision, named and acknowledged the civil rights of African Ameri-
cans only by deforming those rights in invidious racial terms. Even in
conferring rights and legal personhood, law could inflict what the
Brown v. Board of Education ruling would eventually call "stigmatic
injury."1
Even as it anticipated a later regime of law, however, the Lin-
coln anecdote also underscored an important affective dimension to
this system of legal stigma. The marital intimacy that Lincoln's joke
both named and ridiculed had a key importance in the post-
Reconstruction conflict over civil rights. Intimate feeling posed a
particular legal dilemma. Radical Republicans insisted that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the rights of contract meant
that citizens of African descent were free to exchange vows of mar-
riage with a spouse of any race, and in several Southern states legisla-
tors removed anti-miscegenation laws from the books. 2 After only a
9. MARTHA E. HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY SOUTH 22-23 (1997). For an analysis of the earliest laws condemning "shamefull
matches" in Maryland and Virginia, beginning in the 1660s, see Peter W. Bardaglio, "Shamefull
Matches": The Regulation of Interracial Sex and Marriage in the South before 1900, in SEX,
LOVE, RACE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 112 (Martha Hodes ed.,
1999) [hereinafter SEX, LOVE, RACE].
10. See generally SEX, LOVE, RACE, supra note 9, at 1-111.
11. 347 US 483, 493-95 (1954).
12. See Bardaglio, supra note 9, at 122-25. Bardaglio discusses the Republican-dominated
state court in Alabama, which described marriage as a "civil contract" in a ruling that struck
down sanctions against interracial marriage. Id. at 124. In that ruling, the Alabama justices held
that the "same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white citizens means the right to make
any contract which a white citizen may make." Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment were "intended to destroy the distinctions of race and color in respect
to the rights secured by" the law. Id. But cf Randall Kennedy, The Enforcement of Anti-
Miscegenation Laws, in INTERRACIALISM, supra note 6, at 140, 145 (suggesting that "some
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few years, however, the Southern Redeemers, who had ousted
Republican legislatures, swiftly reinstated anti-miscegenation laws-
at the same time nullifying the black-white marriages contracted
during that brief period and installing far more draconian penalties.13
Although the anxiety concerning the genetic mixing of racial popula-
tions ran high, it is striking that interracial sex was not the chief target
of these marriage prohibitions. Indeed, the same laws that newly
banned interracial marriage often decriminalized or reduced the
penalties for black-white concubinage-the sexual relationship white
men would frequently establish with black women. 4
What could it mean that marriage was, in the eyes of the law, a
greater scandal or violation than consensual sexual relations? Histo-
rians and legal scholars have answered that question by pointing to
property. The far harsher punishment of interracial marriage in the
postbellum era, historians argue, was an effort by white lawmakers to
limit the ability of African Americans to inherit white wealth.15 This
contention is no doubt true, yet, there is evidence to suggest a motive
even more fundamental than the white control of property. In the
dominant culture of nineteenth-century America, marriage, in
opposition to sex, bespoke a species of feeling or intimacy that had
become a powerful source of social legitimacy.16  The evidence
suggests that the ban on interracial marriage was an attempt to
censor-to make all but unspeakable-a desire not for sex, but for
marriage, precisely because marital intimacy posed a more profound
challenge to the racial order than either the black inheritance of
property or any genetic mixing of the populations.
The operative distinction between sex and marriage is clearly
visible in Lincoln's laugh line. Lincoln did not attempt to deflect the
scandal of miscegenation by denying sexual desire; indeed, he effec-
tively stipulated that sex across the color line was a recognizable
temptation-a potential desire. But he did so in order to subtract
jurisdiction's miscegenation laws were probably enforced more stringently after the Civil War
than before").
13. For a survey of post-Reconstruction penalties, see Bardaglio, supra note 9, at 122-23;
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 145-46. See generally PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING
THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH
(Thomas A. Green & Hendrik Hartog eds., 1995).
14. See Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, in INTERRACIALISM, supra note 6, at
61,671.
15. See, e.g., id. at 66-68.
16. See generally Kennedy, supra note 12 (discussing the operative legal distinction
between black-white sexual relations and marriage).
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that desire ("if I do not want a black woman for a slave") and thereby
isolated the desire he could count on to incite derision (the wish to
marry her). In other words, he isolated the desire for wedlock alone.
What is at stake here is a desire for law, for licit-ness itself.
Is a desire for lawfulness a feeling we can locate and define in a
meaningful way? Attempts to obtain a marriage license are one kind
of evidence that such a feeling exists, but we have to look elsewhere
for some record of the feeling as a lived sentiment. For the nine-
teenth century, the temporal knitting together of desire and law was
the special provenance of the novel. Literary historians have demon-
strated that the genre of the domestic novel was one of the central
cultural instruments for isolating and transmitting dominant notions
of private feeling as the surest indices of social legitimacy.17 Here is
how one wife in a nineteenth-century novel described this brand of
legal feeling in a meditation on her own certificate of marriage: "A
marriage certificate, rightfully procured, was scarcely less solemn, so
far as it went, than the Bible itself. Her own she cherished as the
apple of her eye. It was the evidence of her wifehood, the seal of her
child's legitimacy, her patent of nobility. ' 18 Like bibles, marriage
contracts can be counted as seals or patents, material objects with a
concentrated cultural meaning through which individuals can cathect
a highly personal, highly affective identification with the law. Novels
themselves were almost identical sorts of objects: material things in
which a reader was invited to identify with numinous properties of
legal feeling- wifehood, legitimacy, nobility-in short, the rewards of
legality as manifested in the intimacies of everyday life.
The wife who speaks of her marriage certificate as a "seal" of her
human nobility is a character from The Marrow of Tradition, a novel
published in 1901 by African-American novelist Charles W.
Chesnutt.1 9 A trained lawyer, Chesnutt also published informed
essays condemning segregation laws and the Plessy decision. 20 But in
17. For influential studies of the novel's role in giving family sentiment the power of
legitimization, see generally NANCY ARMSTRONG, DESIRE AND DOMESTIC FICTION: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE NOVEL (1987); GILLIAN BROWN, DOMESTIC INDIVIDUALISM:
IMAGINING SELF IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990).
18. CHARLES W. CHESNUTr, THE MARROW OF TRADITION (1901), reprinted in CHARLES
W. CHESNUIT: STORIES, NOVELS, & ESSAYS 463, 669 (Werner Sollors ed., 2002) [hereinafter
STORIES, NOVELS, & ESSAYS].
19. Id.
20. See Charles W. Chesnutt, What Is a White Man?, INDEP., May 30, 1889, reprinted in
STORIES, NOVELS, & ESSAYS, supra note 18, at 837, 837-44; Charles W. Chesnutt, The
Disfranchisement of the Negro, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM: A SERIES OF ATICLES BY
REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN NEGROES OF TODAY 79 (Booker T. Washington et al. eds.,
[Vol 78:773
LEGAL FEELING
his fiction, Chesnutt was able to draw upon and then manipulate the
affective power that marital intimacy held for his largely white
reading audience. In Chesnutt's novel, there is, in good Victorian-
novel fashion, a secret in the white Carteret family of North Carolina.
But the hidden, shameful secret, is not sex, not a m~salliance of black
and white lovers, nor even the shame of bastardy. At the heart of the
novel is a critical generic inversion: the Carteret family secret is not
illicit sex but a legal heterosexual marriage.2' Crucially, Olivia
Carteret's extravagant praisesong to her own marriage certificate is
prompted by the panic of discovering a counterdocument, the mar-
riage certificate of her now dead father and a black woman, Julia
Brown, whom her father married in a secret second marriage during
the brief window when Southern states permitted black-white un-
ions.22
Julia was presumed to have been the wealthy man's mistress,
their cohabitation taken for the nonscandal of an open secret. The
piece of paper proving their marriage, however, presented a wildly
different matter, a scandal issuing from legality itself. Importantly,
Chesnutt dwells on the particular contours of Olivia's feelings when
she discovered the hidden certificate. "[D]azed" and then under
great "agitation," she reels from the scandal of the legality of her
father's relations with Julia. "Such a stain upon her father's memory
would be infinitely worse than if he had not married her."23 The
document filled Olivia with a distinct kind of repulsion because it
forced a recognition of the marriage with Julia as an object of her
father's wishes-his desire not just for sex with Julia (something long
conceded) but a desire for wedlock with her. Much more than any
record of illicit sex, the hidden certificate was a kind of obscenity, the
equivalent of a pornographic text. It was, in other words, a profane
document that raised indignation and a fearful question about what
could be desired.
That Chesnutt implanted a secret document, shocking in its legal-
ity rather than in its criminality, reflected a canny use of the social
force of fiction. By presenting to readers a legal document that
operated as something weirdly harmful or prurient, Chesnutt forced
1903), reprinted in STORIES, NOVELS, & ESSAYS, supra note 18, at 874, 874-94; Charles W.
Chesnutt, The Courts and the Negro, Address at the Annual Conference of the Niagara
Movement (c. 1908), in STORIES, NOVELS, & ESSAYS, supra note 18, at 895, 895-905.
21. CHESNUTr, supra note 18, at 571.
22. Id. at 665-68.
23. Id. at 665-66, 671.
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readers to acknowledge a moment when legitimacy (the certified
marriage) and proper family feeling (Olivia's horror) were no longer
identical. The divergence opened a rift in a crucial historical associa-
tion that developed through the novel form in particular, and that
looked to the realm of intimate feeling for moral and ethical confir-
mation of middle-class norms.
Like Chesnutt's character Olivia, the social theorist Jirgen
Habermas used the term "seal" when he described the Intimsphre-
the sphere of private feeling that developed in the middle-class
conjugal family.24 Family intimacy was a seal, Habermas argued,
because it became the public guarantor of a private realm of free and
autonomous human subjectivity.25 Historically, as the bourgeoisie
ascended by way of commerce over aristocracies, their emancipation
produced a consciousness of themselves as private, civil subjects,
beholden only to the supposed reason of the market. "Such an
autonomy of private people," Habermas writes, "had to be capable of
being portrayed as such. ' 26 Thus, "[t]o the autonomy of property
owners in the market corresponded a self-presentation of human
beings in the family. The latter's intimacy, apparently set free from
the constraint of society, was the seal on the truth of a private auton-
omy exerci[s]ed" in a free marketplace. 27
If the seal of family feeling confirmed a human autonomy and
dignity independent of social caste, it was largely the genre of the
novel in which that feeling was presented to public view. Novels
placed the "seal" of legitimacy on particular plots and descriptions of
sentiment as they were displayed in print. Habermas, among others,
demonstrated the way specific forms of writing, in particular the
literary genres of the personal letter and the domestic novel, became
the vehicle by which intimate feeling came to know itself as such.
Only genres set apart as forms for the expression of interior feeling
could materialize private family sentiment as the essence of the
human.28
24. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 46 (Thomas Burger trans., Mass.
Inst. Tech. 1989) (1962). The translator notes that Habermas's "Intimsphare denotes the core of
a person's private sphere which by law, tact, and convention is shielded from intrusion; it is
translated here as 'intimate sphere."' Id. at xvi.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. On the genre of the personal letter, Habermas observes:
[Vol 78:773
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Although this intimacy, then, had its origins in economic and so-
cial developments, intimate family feeling became the discernable
mark or seal to authenticate a domain of pure humanity. And marital
feeling, above all, was the "seal of truth" on the human. Because true
marriage was established voluntarily by free individuals, and pre-
sumed a lasting community of love between spouses, the ideal of
marital intimacy bespoke the noninstrumental development of the
highest human faculties and relations.29 Intimacy, understood as
universally human and wholly private, in that very privacy tended to
serve the specific ends of a bourgeois society seeking to reproduce its
own social and class relations. But this structure meant that it was
intimacy that proved the validity of the social and not vice versa.
Feeling preceded the law.
This seeming priority of intimate feeling presented a stark diffi-
culty for United States anti-miscegenation law. To the extent that
black-white couples demonstrated normative feelings of intimacy by
seeking to marry, the dominant society was confronted with apparent
evidence that such couples possessed the same family feeling that
broadly authenticated the sphere of law itself. The dilemma
prompted an increasingly strenuous effort on the part of American
law to disavow any sign of black-white marital desire. A North
In the intimate sphere of the conjugal family privatized individuals viewed them-
selves as independent even from the private sphere of their economic activity-as
persons capable of entering into "purely human" relations with one another. The
literary form of these at the time was the letter. It is no accident that the eighteenth
century became the century of the letter: through letter writing the individual unfolded
himself in his subjectivity.
Id. at 48 (internal citation omitted). The letter, Habermas further claims, was a crucial impetus
for the development of the novel. Because letters and diaries directed the expressions of the
self toward a real or posited addressee, he contends,
Subjectivity, as the innermost core of the private, was always already oriented to an audi-
ence (Publikum).... Thus, the directly or indirectly audience-oriented subjectivity of the
letter exchange or diary explained the origin of the typical genre and authentic literary
achievement of that century: the domestic novel, the psychological description in autobio-
graphical form.
Id. at 49.
29. The bourgeois family, Habermas argues,
seemed to be established voluntarily and by free individuals and to be maintained without
coercion; it seemed to rest on the lasting community of love on the part of two spouses; it
seemed to permit that non-instrumental development of all faculties that marks the culti-
vated personality. The three elements of voluntariness, community of love, and cultivation
were conjoined in a concept of the humanity that was supposed to inhere in humankind as
such and truly to constitute its absoluteness: the emancipation (still resonating with talk of
'pure' or 'common' humanity) of an inner realm, following its own laws, from extrinsic
purposes of any sort.
Id. at 46-47.
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Carolina court described, in an 1877 decision, the prospect of interra-
cial marriage as "revolting," a juridical sentiment it underscored as
crucial proof despite its concession that this was "[not] the common
sentiment of the civilized and Christian world. ' 30 It was not sufficient
for courts to declare such marriages criminal; the motive or desire for
marriage-the legitimizing feeling-was the real crux of the issue.
Thus, courts, litigants, and white observers bear witness to their own
disgust and distress at black-white unions, for in doing so, they offer
their own juridical feeling-a lawful "revulsion"-as the only defini-
tive evidence to counter the evidence of interracial marital desire.
Interestingly, the disavowal of such marital feeling at times extended
even to representations of interracial intimacy. In addition to their
prohibitions on marriage, several states added statutes banning any
publication of "general information, arguments, or suggestions in
favor of social equality or of intermarriage between whites and
Negroes," on penalty of fines, or imprisonment, or both.31
This kind of impassioned concern for protecting marital feeling is
visible in the court's response to a North Carolina case, Ferrall v.
Ferrall.32 In the Ferrall suit, a husband sought to void his marriage to
his wife on the grounds that she was of Negro descent "within the
prohibited degree," even though she had been socially received as a
white woman prior to his charge.33 This white man's defense against
his wife's suit for alimony was that their tie was never marital; misce-
genation law nullified any marriage between a white person and a
person of African descent.3 4 Therefore, the Ferrall home, the hus-
band argued, was never founded on real domestic feeling: unbe-
knownst to the world, he had no (white) wife to begin with and hence
no real home.35
The strategy misfired badly. The court was outraged at a man
who would "for the sake of a divorce" sell off the integrity of his own
30. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 246 (1877). As to the legal implications of the nonuniversal-
ity of aversion to interracial marriage, see Kennedy, supra note 12, at 154-55.
31. William D. Zabel, Interracial Marriage and the Law, in INTERRACIALISM, supra note 6,
at 54, 58. For further discussion on the censorship of representations of interracial love or
marriage, see id. at 54-61. Also see Sollors, supra note 6, at 5, for a discussion of "the infamous
American 'Motion Picture Production Code' of 1934 that urged filmmakers to uphold the
'sanctity of the institution of marriage and the home,' while simultaneously stating: 'Miscegena-
tion (sex relationship between the white and black races) is forbidden."'
32. 69 S.E. 60 (N.C. 1910).
33. Id. at 60-61.
34. Id. at 61-62.
35. Id. at 60, 62.
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claim to untainted marital intimacy. "Certainly of all men he should
have welcomed the verdict that decided his wife and children are
white," the court intoned.3 6 The court preferred to defend the now
suspect identity of the wife as a white woman and to divide the
husband's property with her and her children rather than give cre-
dence to the husband's incrimination of his own marital feeling.
The legal disavowal of the notion that a black-white couple could
possess recognizable feelings of marital intimacy continued well into
the twentieth century, even as the ability to choose when and whom
to marry (or to divorce) became increasingly respected as a preroga-
tive of the individual alone. In 1917, American writer J.A. Rogers
asserted that "the right to select one's mate is one of the most ancient,
most sacred of individual rights. 3 7 Actually, the supposed "right"
that Rogers cites is neither ancient nor sacred; historically, compan-
ionate choice in marriage is a fairly new notion, and to this day, the
right of selection is withheld from whole populations, namely, homo-
sexual men and women. But it is altogether apt that Rogers expresses
this belief in the sacred nature of marital choice in a novel, just as the
most powerful anti-miscegenation works of the same period were the
best-selling segregation novels of Thomas Dixon.
The novel form was the recognized dwelling place for expres-
sions of authentic intimacy-its home in print. It was this fact that
allowed Chesnutt to use the genre in its capacity as public vehicle for
disclosing the truth of family feeling, to write a novel that turned
middle-class intimacy against itself. In The Marrow of Tradition,
Chesnutt can be said to be repeating Lincoln's joke in reverse. By
plotting Olivia's discovery of the marriage contract, he removed the
question of interracial sex in order to isolate an irrefutable desire for
marital intimacy, the same desire that white laughter was meant to
disavow. When Chesnutt's readers opened the generic box, as it
were, where they expected to see illicit scandal, they found instead
their own "seal of truth," conjugal intimacy, used to authenticate a
proscribed black-white relation.
After Olivia discovered the certificate, her shock and distress ul-
timately led to the most blatant kind of disavowal; she burned the
document,3 8 an act that testifies to the emotional "truth" it wanted
most to conceal. Like the laws that prohibited any "arguments or
36. Id. at 62-63 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
37. J. A. ROGERS, FROM "SUPERMAN" TO MAN 80 (1989).
38. CHESNUTT, supra note 18, at 665-66.
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suggestions" of interracial marital love, Chesnutt's plot made clear
that it is intimacy or marital feeling, not sex, that prompts this censor-
ship. Chesnutt's plot predicted the novel's own fate. His contempo-
rary readers seemed to have responded to the novel much as Olivia
responded to the certificate, with a displeasure that essentially
removed the narrative from public view. Reviewing Chesnutt's novel,
leading critic William Dean Howells conceded the truth of its searing
critique of Jim Crow society, but labeled the novel a "bitter, bitter"
book.39 Branded with this literary stigma, the novel was largely
ignored, and after The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt's once promis-
ing career as a novelist was over.
Despite this opposition by his contemporary readers, Chesnutt's
novel opens for us a moment when Chesnutt could seize upon marital
intimacy, a desire for law, as a force able to be directed against the
law itself. In this way, the novel anticipated the cultural develop-
ments that would lead to Loving v. Virginia. In Loving, the desire of
a black-white couple to marry posed a claim to the feeling the Court
could not continue to hold criminal without fatally undercutting the
"freedom to marry" as a human desire "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 4 Yet the law's ability, for close to
seventy years, to trump the charge of "arbitrary and invidious"
discrimination with "repulsive" community feeling suggests that
American society long continued to selectively oppose arguments of
intimacy by deploying powers of legal stigma. As the controversies
over same-sex marriage law attest, if marital intimacy can still make
public claims on legitimacy in the name of feeling, so too is such
feeling still subject to "stigmatic injury." Governance by legal feeling
carries a tax that is borne unequally by different populations.
39. W. D. Howells, A Psychological Counter-Current in Recent Fiction, 173 N. AM. REV.
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